股吧投資專家對實質盈餘管理影響之探究

Abstract

隨著科技進步與經濟蓬勃發展，網路使用率攀升帶動中國網路投資平台(以下簡稱：股吧)逐漸增加，投資人可於股吧分享投資意見。既有中國股吧文獻指出，股吧的投資意見具有資訊內涵。因此，當具有影響力股吧投資專家開始追蹤一家公司，會帶動其他投資人關注。投資人的關注對公司經理人員可能產生監督與壓力效果，進而影響其進行實質盈餘管理誘因。一方面，經理人員可能降低實質盈餘管理誘因以降低被投資人偵測風險。另一方面，經理人員可能為達到具有影響力股吧投資專家的盈餘預期而進行損益操縱。本論文目的係探討具有影響力股吧投資專家首次加入追蹤後對公司實質盈餘管理的影響。實證結果顯示，在具有影響力股吧投資專家首次加入追蹤後，公司之實質盈餘管理並未顯著增加。進一步分析顯示，在具有影響力股吧投資專家加入追蹤後，公司之異常銷管費用會顯著增加。

With the advancement of technology and flourishing economic development,increasing internet usage has driven the gradual growth of online investment platforms (hereafter Gub) in China. Investors can share their investment opinions on Gub. Extant literature on Chinese Gub suggests that investment opinions on Gub have information content. Therefore, when influential Gub's investment experts start to follow a company, it attracts the attention of other investors. The incentives of firms' managers to engage in real earnings management will be affected because the influential Gub's investment experts may monitor and pressure firms' managers. On the one hand, managers may reduce their incentives to manipulate earnings to lower the probability of being detected by investors. On the other hand, managers may manipulate earnings to meet the earnings expectations of influential Gub's investment experts. This study aims to examine whether firms' real earnings management changes when influential Gub's investment experts start to follow a company. The empirical results indicate no significant increase in real earnings management by a firm when influential Gub's investment experts start to follow it. Further analysis reveals that abnormal selling and administrative expenses significantly increase when influential Gub's investment experts begin to follow a firm.